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Abstract:
In this paper we investigate when the male-female wage diﬀerential arises: Does
it evolve over the early career or does it exist right from entry into ﬁrst employ-
ment? For the analysis we use new administrative longitudinal data for Germany.
Models with within ﬁrm job rationing or equilibrium matching show that from
entry into the ﬁrst job onwards women will be paid less than men. The main
reason is that due to higher quit rates of women, ﬁrms are less willing to invest
in ﬁrm speciﬁc training for women. In this paper we document empirically that
these models can explain a substantial portion of the gender wage diﬀerentials
among young skilled workers in Germany.
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1 Introduction
Since the early 90s the gender wage gap has been analysed in an increasing
number of longitudinal studies primarily using U.S. data (Loprest (1992), Light
and Ureta (1990), Kim and Polachek (1994), Light and Ureta (1995), O’Neill
and Polachek (1993), Blau and Kahn (1997)).2 In contrast to cross-sectional
data, the main advantage of panel data is that actual years of work experience
can be constructed which provide a more precise measure of human capital. It
has been shown that work experience together with information on the timing of
interruptions in work can explain up to 30 percent of the total wage gap (O’Neill
and Polachek (1993)).
In this study we build on these earlier studies by examining the evolution of the
wage gap. More particularly, the issues addressed are whether a wage gap exists
from entry into ﬁrst employment onwards and whether it is a permanent compo-
nent of the gap across the career, or whether the wage gap evolves over time in the
labour market. For this purpose we use new German administrative data on 12
cohorts of workers who have received vocational apprenticeship training that are
advantageous over several other data sources to understand the gender wage gap
better. In these data we can observe workers’ complete training and employment
histories. Workers who participate in apprenticeship programmes compose 50-60
percent of the German work force. The sample is large and comprises a group
of workers, for which we can measure wages and human capital acquisition very
precisely. Since we focus on young workers that are observed from the beginning
of their career, we can construct ﬂow variables without using retrospective infor-
mation that may induce measurement error problems.3 To anticipate the main
2Other studies for Sweden are by Albrecht et al. (1999) and for the U.K. by Bell and Ritchie
(1998)
3Retrospective information is crucial in the PSID to construct work experience for all work-
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descriptives in these data, looking at wages for full time (vocationally) skilled
workers4 conditional on work experience, we ﬁnd that the male-female diﬀeren-
tial in entry wages is large, approximately 25 percent. Throughout the early
career, it stays virtually constant at this level.
One may expect that if men gain more from an extra year of work than women
then the male-female wage gap increases within cohorts over time. This pat-
tern corresponds to what had been found in earlier studies estimating traditional
earnings equations using measures of potential work experience. More recent
studies for the U.S., using measures of actual work experience, have found that
the return to experience for men and women is similar (e.g. Kim and Polachek
(1994)). However, others have shown that various aspects of women’s work expe-
rience contribute to the wage gap. Light and Ureta (1995) ﬁnd that 7-10 percent
of the gap is accounted for by the timing of work experience spells during the
early career. Loprest (1992) demonstrates that although men and women are
equally mobile (across ﬁrms) during the ﬁrst four years in the labour market,
men gain up to 50 percent more than women from each ﬁrm change. In this
paper we document empirically that the sorting of women into low wage occu-
pational training schemes also explains a substantial fraction of the gender wage
diﬀerentials. The main reason for this according to models with within ﬁrm job
rationing and equilibrium matching is that, due to higher quit rates of women,
ﬁrms are less willing to pay for human capital investment of women.
The fact that women experience more interruptions in their working careers
may induce a non-random selection of women into the work force that complicates
the empirical analysis of the gender wage gap. This is particularly true when fol-
ers.
4We deﬁne skilled as those with 10 years of schooling and 2 to 3 years of vocational , that
is apprenticeship, training schemes. We provide more details in the empirical section of the
paper.
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lowing young men and women during their early careers; this is the period when
women are most frequently out of the labour force.5 More particularly, sample
selection induces problems for the calculation of simple means, and their decom-
position. The exclusion of (female) nonparticipants could understate the gender
gap in wage oﬀers, via the biased mean of the female wage oﬀer distribution.6
In this study, we suggest an extension of the standard decomposition (Blinder
(1973), Oaxaca (1973)) in order to account for these eﬀects on the means of the
human capital variables in the estimation of the explained fraction of the gap.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First, we review theoretical
models on the evolution of the male-female wage diﬀerential. Second, we outline
the empirical strategy for estimating the gender wage gap. Third, we describe
the data and present summary statistics. Fourth, we show the descriptives on
wage proﬁles of young male and female workers. Fifth, we present the estimation
results for the decomposition of the gap. Finally, we conclude.
2 Theoretical Models
From economic theory, predictions about the evolution of the gap are ambiguous.
General human capital models (Zellner (1975) and Polachek (1981)) predict that
women should have higher wages in the ﬁrst job than men because men tend
to invest in more general training than women which is paid for through lower
wages. Wage proﬁles for males are as a consequence relatively steep due to
returns to training. Hence, the wage gap increases over time. The prediction of
a wage advantage of women at entry into work seems to ﬁnd empirically little
support, which casts doubts on these theories (Light and Ureta (1995), Loprest
5This can also be seen from table 5 in Light and Ureta (1995) who do not address this issue.
6A similar problem has been addressed in Neal and Johnson (1996) in the context of racial
gaps in median wages.
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(1992)). More complex models with ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital and asymmetric
information (Lazear and Rosen (1990)) generate an increasing wage gap as well,
yet make no predictions regarding entry wages. The following summarises two
models that rationalise both a positive wage gap at entry and a positive, possibly
increasing wage gap in experience.
The model by Kuhn (1993) generates within ﬁrm job rationing based on group
demographic attributes. Shared investment into ﬁrm speciﬁc training is intro-
duced into an equilibrium model of job allocation in which equally-productive
demographic groups diﬀer in terms of their labor force attachment. The general
model is set in a multiperiod framework where jobs with no training and with ﬁrm
speciﬁc training exist. Training takes place in the ﬁrst period of the employment
relationship. Workers pay a fraction α of the training costs. It is assumed that
men stay always in the labour market while females exit with probability p. In
the two period case, if p < 0.5 gender segregation occurs. Furthermore, it can be
shown that male wage proﬁles are everywhere above the female proﬁle in the post
training period as well as in the ﬁrst period if α < 0.5. Hence, non-crossing pro-
ﬁles arise: men are paid up front expected future productivity. With both better
job assignments and lower exit rates, men have higher expected future produc-
tivity than women. Allowing for re-entry after withdrawal mitigates the adverse
consequences for the low labor forces attachment group, yet, does not eliminate
them completely. The model predicts lower earnings, slower wage growth and
less on the job training for the low attachment group, similar to the models by
Zellner (1975) and Polachek (1981), and Lazear and Rosen (1990). In addition,
and contrary to the formerly mentioned models, it predicts lower starting wages
for the low attachment group.
In the Barron et al. (1993) model trained workers are more productive, simi-
larly to the Kuhn model, due to more general and ﬁrm speciﬁc training, and, in
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addition, due to more eﬃcient use of capital. This model also allows workers to
leave the ﬁrm either to exit the labour market or to move to another ﬁrm because
they receive a better wage oﬀer. An assumption of the model is that male and
female workers diﬀer with respect to their labour force participation. The authors
show that workers with a lower exit probability are more likely to change ﬁrms.
However, their expected tenure is still higher than for workers with a high exit
probability. Those with low exit probability receive higher post training wages in
order to lower their probability of moving to another ﬁrm. More generally, given
women’s weaker attachment to the labour market, the model predicts that they
will receive lower starting wages and lower wage growth over time. In addition,
they will be sorted into jobs oﬀering less training and using less capital. Put
diﬀerently, workers with low expected exit rate have greater expected tenure and
therefore higher expected proﬁts. These are partly paid back to the worker by
higher starting wages.
3 Estimation Strategy
The most common approach to measure male-female wage diﬀerentials in the
literature is the Oaxaca (1973) decomposition. The Oaxaca (1973) decomposition
is given by:
(lnwMt − lnwFt ) = βˆM(X¯Mt − X¯Ft ) + X¯Ft (βˆM − βˆF ) (1)
where the price vectors βM and βF are recovered after estimating lnwgit = X
g
itβ
g+
git for males (g = M), and females (g = F ), respectively. We denote the natural
logarithm of the wage of individual i in period t as lnwit, Xit is a vector of human
capital characteristics, β the vector of prices and it is a random error about
which we make standard assumptions. Superbars indicate means. It follows that
the diﬀerence in mean wages can be decomposed into a component explained
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by diﬀerences in endowments and an unexplained, residual, component due to
diﬀerences in prices.
In the following, we assume that the individual human capital characteristics
included in Xgit are not measured with error, such that they bias gender diﬀer-
ences. Furthermore, we assume that the male sample regression coeﬃcients are
suitable competitive market prices used as the weight β and estimated consis-
tently. That means that we assume that non-random sample selection leaves
estimates unaﬀected. The intuition for this assumption is that men participate
almost constantly once they have entered the labour market.7 Relaxing this as-
sumption and considering potential upward bias of the parameter estimate of
βM due to unobserved heterogeneity leads to an upper bound estimate of the
explained part of the gender wage gap.
We want to apply the approach to decompose the wage gap among workers at
entry into ﬁrst job (i.e. 0 years of work experience), 1 year of experience, two years
etc.. In order to draw inference across long employment history data, one must
take account of changes in the population, i.e. non-random sample selection,
and its impact on mean characteristics, X¯. This point is particularly relevant
when looking at the early careers of male and female workers, where females are
likely to drop out of the sample. The exclusion of (female) nonparticipants could
understate the gender gap in wage oﬀers, via the biased mean of the female wage
oﬀer distribution.
In contrast to the Oaxaca decomposition, our decomposition approach takes
into account this selection problem. While the Oaxaca decomposition only makes
use of information on participants, we extend this approach and exploit the in-
formation on non-participants as well. This allows for an unbiased comparison of
estimates of the diﬀerentials in characteristics and the wage gap decomposition
7This is a common assumption in the literature used, e.g., in Blau and Kahn (1996).
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across time, under the above assumption that the relevant vector of prices, βMt ,
is estimated consistently from the male sample wage regression model.
Suppose the hypothetical overall wage diﬀerential between two groups of work-
ers can be written as a weighted average of the observed mean diﬀerential within
the group of participating workers and the predicted wage diﬀerential within
non-participating workers.
lnwMt − lnwFt = (ρMpt lnwMpt − ρFpt lnwFpt)
+ ((1− ρMpt ) lnwMnt − (1− ρFpt) lnwFnt) (2)
where ρMpt = N
M
pt /(N
M
pt + N
M
nt ) is the fraction of participating male workers; N
M
pt
is the total number of male workers paricipating in period t. For females ρFpt can
be written accordingly. The subscript p indexes participating individual spells,
and n non-participating ones.
For illustration, assume two periods: t∗, t, where t∗ < t. In period t∗ everybody
is working, and in period t a positive proportion of workers are participating in
the labour market, whilst the remainder, (1-ρ), are not. Since everybody is
working in period t∗, calculation of the mean diﬀerential and the decomposition
are straightforward.
For period t, however, we need to predict wages for those who are not partici-
pating in the labour market. Predictions are estimated as follows:
lnwFnit = lˆnw
F
nit + uˆ
F
nit ⇔ lnwFnit = XFpit∗βˆFt + uˆFnit (3)
where the subscript n denotes non-participation.
If selection is only on observables, and each individual is observed at least once
in the wage sample, then one can simply predict wages for each non-participating
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individual as follows:
lˆnwFnit = X
F
pit∗βˆ
F
t (4)
where we use XFnit = X
F
pit∗ . This is done since we only observe the characteristics
as long as the individuals are participants.
If selection is also on unobservables, then one can predict the residuals for
non-participants by using an individual’s percentile in the residual wage distri-
bution, q, in period t∗.8 That is: uˆFnit = F
−1
pt (Fpt∗(u
F
pit∗)) where Fpt (and Fpt∗)
is the cumulative distribution of the error term in period t (t∗). An underlying
assumption is that for non-participants the position in the residual distribution,
or their unobserved characteristics, do not change after the time of withdrawal
from the labour market. In order to derive the components of the decomposition
following equation (1) and (2), we predict mean wages for females at male prices
using equation (3) accordingly.
4 The data and summary statistics
For the empirical analyses, we use the IAB employment sample (IABS)9 for
West-Germany which is an administrative event history data set. The IABS is a
1 percent random sample drawn from all workers in West-Germany with at least
one employment spell in which they were eligible for the social security insurance
scheme. The population includes all dependent employees in the private sector,
i.e. about 80 percent of total employment in West-Germany.10 The data contains
information on whether an individual is in full-time work, part-time work, un-
employment and interruption which captures national service and maternity - or
8This approach is similar to Juhn et al. (1993).
9IABS abbreviates the Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Sample.
10Not included are: civil servants, self-employed, unpaid family workers and people who are
not eligible for beneﬁts from the social security system. For more details see Bender et al.
(1996).
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parental - leave. A unit of observation in the data is a spell, and not necessarily
a yearly spell.
From the IABS we select a sample of young workers who have received appren-
ticeship training. This group of workers we refer to as skilled in the following,
excluding workers who have not participated in an apprenticeship and workers
with a university or technical college degree. The data sample from the IABS
oﬀers several advantages for our analyses over the data used in the literature
so far. First, the data provide administrative reports on earnings, employment
and non-employment spells; a clear improvement over the self-reported earnings
measures that US data sets typically use.11 Second, since we observe complete
training and employment histories, the data are very precise in human capital
investment. We can follow workers from entry into ﬁrst employment onwards
and generate actual years of experience. Furthermore, we have information on
education, as well as gender, occupation, and the ﬁrm. Third, the sample is very
homogeneous with respect to education, most have 10 years of schooling and
2 to 3 years of apprenticeship training. This reduces unobserved heterogeneity
problems and strengthens the predictive power of the human capital variables.
Fourth, we can construct and follow 12 cohorts from start of apprenticeship train-
ing onwards which is much better than most panel data sets.12 The data cover 15
years, 1975-1990, and post-apprenticeship employment histories can be followed
for up to 12 years. Furthermore, it is a large longitudinal data. For comparison
the NLSY contains only information on 7 cohorts and the sample size is smaller.
For the ﬁnal sample, we select only records on young full-time workers13. We
11See Bollinger (1998) for a discussion on measurement error problems in the CPS data.
12Light and Ureta (1995) uses the NLS that includes approximately 9000 individuals aged
14 to 24 when the survey began. Women are followed from 1968 to 1985, and men from 1966
to 1981. Loprest (1992) uses NLSY (The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth) a survey of
12686 young people who were 14-21 years old in 1978 and are followed from 1979-1983.
13Full time is deﬁned as 35 working hours or more per week. This rule leads to exclusion of
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select individuals who enter training before 1988, who have undertaken training
for at least 450 days without interruption14, who have no further vocational
training and who do not obtain a technical college or university degree. To
ensure that individual employment and wage histories are observed from the
beginning, we select individuals not older than 15 years in 1975. As a result,
the data include individuals who are followed over early careers, i.e. the oldest
individuals are 30 and the mean age is 23.15 Our ﬁnal sample contains 14563
female and 19710 male workers observed in at least one full-time working spell
after completion of vocational training. A working spell is deﬁned as a spell with
observed wages in full-time work. The wage variable is the logarithm of the daily
pre-tax wage deﬂated by the consumer price index from the German statistics
oﬃce. In the estimations, we use working spells from 1980 onwards, excluding
implausibly short apprenticeships of very young workers. The total number of
working spells is 86015 for females and 124540 for males.
A shortcoming of the IABS is that it does not contain a detailed hours of work
variable. While focusing on full-time workers does limit the possible diﬀerence
in hours of work across individuals, there still may be a problem if women on
average are working less hours per day than men. To address this problem we
use information on weekly hours of work that is available in the Socio-Economic
Panel for Germany (SOEP) from 1984 onwards. In Figure 1, average hours of
work for male and female full time workers younger than 30 with 11 to 13 years
of education are plotted. Females work approximately 40 hours in 1984 and 38-
39 hours in 1990. Males work one to three hours more than females.16 Hence,
3 percent of spells for males and 18.6 percent of spells for females.
14This is the recommended selection rule by the IAB.
15It turns out that our sample consists of individuals who are strongly attached to the labour
market, until the point of time of drop out. See Light and Ureta (1990) who analyse a similar
sample for the U.S..
16We use actual hours of work, including overtime.
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diﬀerences in hours of work can account for 7 percent of the wage diﬀerential17,
or more in case of non-linearly increasing overtime premiums, leaving more than
18 percent unexplained in our data.
Figure 1 here
The information we have allows us to measure the productivity related char-
acteristics of skilled workers. Apprentices start typically at age 16 and involves
2 to 3 years of training with a ﬁrm, and wages amount to about 20-30 percent
of the wage of a blue or white collar worker. In order to receive a certiﬁcate
for the particular occupational qualiﬁcation acquired, apprentices have to pass
written and oral examinations, and practical exercises in craftsmanship. Exams
are uniﬁed across Germany or the states (La¨nder) and are held externally by the
chambers of commerce and trade and chambers of craft.18 During the period
of 1975 to 1990, apprenticeships within the German apprenticeship programme
could be undertaken in about 350 occupations, ranging from technical to service
occupations, and in all sectors, including large or small, private or public ﬁrms
of the economy.
Human capital characteristics are constructed from the entire records starting
at entry into apprenticeship. We measure schooling before apprenticeship, age
at entry into training - which proxies further schooling until entry into appren-
ticeship -, the duration of apprenticeship and the occupational qualiﬁcation. We
deﬁne the occupational qualiﬁcation as the occupation in which apprenticeship
training has been undertaken. Furthermore, we can identify the ﬁrm and indus-
try that training has been undertaken in. An additional variable that we use is
the apprenticeship cohort, that is the year of entry into apprenticeship.
17For simplicity, for this calculation we assume that the derivative of daily wages with respect
to hours worked is linear.
18For a detailed description of the German dual system apprenticeship programme see Mu¨nch
(1992).
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General human capital acquisition during employment is measured by years of
actual work experience. This variable is constructed from the individual post-
apprenticeship wage spells. These spells also include details on the employer, the
industry, occupation of work and a crude measure of job status. Additionally, we
consider the transition of human capital from apprenticeship to ﬁrst employment.
In order to take account of ﬁrm19, occupation and industry20 speciﬁc components
of training, we generate binary skill match variables. Stayers with respect to
occupation, for example, are deﬁned as individuals for which in a working spell
the occupation of work is the same as the occupational qualification. Occupation
at work as well as occupational qualiﬁcation are measured on the three digit level.
Employment Rates
Figures 2 and 3 plot employment rates for our male and female workers, respec-
tively, who ﬁrst entered employment in 1975, 1977, 1979 or 1981. in our sample.
In the graph for males the ﬁrst line shows employment rates for the ﬁrst cohort.
These workers have started apprenticeship in 1975 and the majority enter ﬁrst
employment within 2 to 3 years after training.21 As expected, males’ employment
rates for all cohorts monotonically increase to a level of 80 to 90 percent then,
and stay relatively constant. By contrast, for females, as is shown in Figure 3,
we ﬁnd that employment rates increase at ﬁrst, but then decline. This can be
seen most clearly for the 1975 cohort where employment rates fall to less than
40 percent by 1990. This decline in participation presumably reﬂects the eﬀect
of child bearing and rearing. For a longer observation window, one would expect
employment rates to go up again due to females returning to employment after
19Firm identiﬁers are given to each establishment in the IABS. Large ﬁrms are split into
establishments with diﬀerent ﬁrm identiﬁcation numbers.
20Industries are distinguished into approximately 99 groups (2-digits). The category refers
to the main sector of value addition.
21For a few individuals we observe wages for working in a job eligible to social security prior
to apprenticeship. We drop these unskilled work wages from our analysis sample.
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periods of parental leave.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 here
4.1 Male and female workers
We ﬁrst show means for various characteristics at the entry into ﬁrst employment
spell for males and females in Table (1). Workers are homogeneous with respect to
education; virtually all of them have an intermediate secondary schooling degree,
i.e. 10 years of schooling. They are also homogeneous with respect to type
of tertiary education since all have undertaken an apprenticeship programme.
Duration of the programmes varies, however, lasting on average 2.18 years for
females and 2.51 years for males. It turns out that females and males are both
of similar age in their ﬁrst employment; women are on average 20.3 years of age
whilst men are only 0.2 years older.
Table 1 here
Despite similarities of the quantity of education and vocational training, we ﬁnd
striking gender diﬀerences in the type of training, i.e. occupational qualification.
Similarly to other Western industrialized countries, females are more likely to be
qualiﬁed in services, such as a professional clerical worker or receptionist, while
males are more likely to do apprenticeships in manufacturing, for example, as a
motor vehicle mechanic or electrician.
Occupational segregation in ﬁrst employment can also be seen from the statis-
tics on the broad measure for job status. Results are as expected: For example,
76.2 percent of women work in white collar jobs, whereas 64.8 percent of men
work in blue collar jobs. Perhaps striking in international comparison, however, is
that about 70 percent of all workers are categorised as skilled, which implies that
almost 50 percent of the entire population are categorized as (occupationally)
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skilled at the young age of 20.22
The skill match variables reveal quite strikingly high shares of stayers, in partic-
ular, in the occupation of qualification, i.e. 73 percent for females and 65 percent
for males, and with the training ﬁrm, 63 and 70 percent, respectively. High shares
of stayers may suggest that one ﬁnds positive returns for staying and losses for
moving between ﬁrms, jobs (occupations) or industries due to non-transferability
of human capital. Looking at Figure 4, we see that also across time mobility with
respect to occupational qualiﬁcation is quite low; particularly for female workers.
After 6 years of work approximately 60 percent of females and 50 percent of males
are still working in the 3-digit occupation they have received their apprenticeship
training in.
Figure 4 here
Contrary to evidence from cross sectional data for the entire work force, we
ﬁnd that young females are working more than males in our sample, which is
not shown here. At the mean females work 3.69 years and males 3.58, with the
diﬀerence signiﬁcant at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level.23
Table 2 here
4.2 Female workers and drop outs
In order to derive evidence on the sample selection bias caused by female workers’
withdrawal from work, we show summary statistics for females who drop out and
22To do this calculation one needs to keep in mind that about 50-60 percent of the population
in Germany undertakes apprenticeships (Mu¨nch, 1992). In comparison, in the U.K. for the
period 1990-1992 GHS data shows that only 27.9 percent of all male and 19.4 percent of all
female aged 25-34 reached a degree or a higher educational level. See: Harkness (1996).
23One must note that national service is compulsory for men in Germany. It took 15 months
(20 months) from 1972 until 1989 depending on whether military service or civil service was
served. In Germany, the average age of mothers at ﬁrst birth was 25.19 in 1980 and 26.93
in 1990 (See Statistische Bundesamt: Bevo¨lkerung und Erwerbsta¨tigkeit, Fachserie 1, Reihe 1,
1999). Hence, we have few individual records with an interruption due to having children in
the data.
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females who work continuously. We deﬁne continuously working as those who
work in two consecutive periods, t-1 and t, and drop outs as those who are working
in t-1 but not working in t. To demonstrate the main ﬁnding, in Table 2 we show
means for the selected group of females who drop out just after completion of two
years of working and those who continue working. The results do not change when
we look at work experience levels up to 6 years. Most interestingly, we ﬁnd that
drop outs have experienced longer spells of time out of work and they have lower
levels of schooling and training. They also are more likely to be employed in blue
collar jobs and they are more likely to change occupation to one that is diﬀerent
from their occupational qualiﬁcation. All of these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level. In conclusion, we ﬁnd that women who drop out of the labour
market have less favourable observed characteristics at the mean than those who
stay in work. This is consistent with models explaining the gender wage gap,
like in Polachek (1981), Kuhn (1993), Lazear and Rosen (1990). These models
assume that females have a comparative advantage outside the labour market
which is why they are more likely to drop out. We ﬁnd that females staying on
in work are positively selected which will lead to a lower gender wage gap among
accepted wages than oﬀered wages.
5 Wage profiles over the early career
In Figure 5 we plot wages as a function of actual work experience. We applied
a robust non-linear smoothing technique. At entry into ﬁrst employment a con-
siderable diﬀerential in wages is observed.24 Thereafter, wage experience proﬁles
for men and women are slightly concavely shaped and seem to develop in almost
24What is not shown here is that before entry into ﬁrst employment - that is while workers
are in apprenticeship training and while they earn only approximately 30 percent of skilled
workers’ wages - the mean wages are very similar for males and females.
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parallel fashion. The diﬀerential, accordingly, stays almost constant during this
period at around 0.25.
Figure 5 here
In the following, we investigate the evolution of the gap further. In order to
make workers comparable within periods, we make use of the detailed human cap-
ital characteristics. Across periods, we take account of the fact that the sample
used in Figure 5 varies in its composition due to drop-outs. This mainly applies
to young females withdrawing from work temporarily due to child bearing and
rearing. Hence, while in period 0 for all females and males accepted wages are
observed by period 8 a selected group of females for which we observe accepted
wages is compared with the complete sample of males. In case of positive selec-
tion, as the descriptives suggest, this implies the underestimation of the overall
gap, as well as the explained gap.25 In our empirical analysis, we focus on the
consistent estimation of the explained part of the gap.
6 Estimation Results
In the regression analysis, we estimate wages as a function of years of work
experience and human capital characteristics as detailed before in Table 1. Given
the results in Figure 5, we choose to allow for a ﬂexible functional form so we let
the coeﬃcient on experience vary across integer years of experience, and allow for
(apprenticeship) cohort speciﬁc coeﬃcients. This also enables us to break down
the total gap into the explained part and the residual at each level of experience.
25Since sample selection may not be random, in this graph the slope of female sample wage
proﬁle may be biased (Heckman (1979)). In case of positive sample selection bias the slope is
likely to be ﬂatter, leading to a relatively larger wage gap. We do not deal with this problem
regarding the total gap.
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More formally, we estimate the following simple empirical wage equation:
lnwit = β0 + exitβ1 + citβ2 + (ex ∗ c)itβ3 + Ttβ4 + Zitδ + uit (5)
where i indexes individuals and t time. The dependent variable is the loga-
rithmic daily wage, lnw. The variable ex denotes a vector of dummies for each
integer year of work experience, c a vector of dummies for each apprenticeship
cohort, and T contains dummies for the calendar year. Correspondingly, (ex ∗ c)
are the interactions of these variables. Zit is a vector of detailed human capital
controls, such as age at entry, duration of apprenticeship training and occupa-
tional ﬁxed eﬀects. Note that a subset of these are varying across individuals
but are time-invariant. The term uit is idiosyncratic error. We allow for a fully
ﬂexible speciﬁcation in work experience, cohort and time26; the coeﬃcients are
estimated by ordinary least squares. Assuming that human capital acquisition
depends only on work experience and cohort-speciﬁc factors, time dummy vari-
ables enter the equation in an additive fashion. Hence, it is assumed that the
time trend captures the general price of human capital level in the economy and
that only shifts of the intercept are relevant (See Dustmann and Meghir (1999)).
The coeﬃcient of the work experience variable can be interpreted as the gain
from an extra year of on the job training. Coeﬃcients of the cohort variable
capture between cohort diﬀerences due to, for example, variation in education
institutions during the observation period, or variation in quality of training
across cohorts. In addition, cohort eﬀects control for changes in the outside the
labour market options or reservation wages, which aﬀects selection into work
(Lazear and Rosen (1990) and Kuhn (1993)). Hence, more generally, the ﬂexible
functional form takes account of supply and demand factors. Time eﬀects control
for general macroeconomic eﬀects. For identiﬁcation of the experience, (training)
26At the same time we lose of eﬃciency.
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cohort and time eﬀect, we use the fact that within a given year we have variation
in (training) cohort, and that we have variation in time out of work periods across
individuals.
6.1 The gender wage gap decomposition
The estimated parameter vector from the male sample regression27 is used to gen-
erate the decomposition of the male-female wage gap as in equation (1). Taking
account of selection due to non-participants the explained part of the wage gap
can be separated into three components:
βMt (X
M
t −XFt ) = βMt (ρMpt XMpt − ρFpt XFpt)
+ βMt ((1− ρMpt )XMnt − (1− ρFpt)XFnt)
+ (uˆMt − uˆ∗Ft ) (6)
where uˆMt = 0, and uˆ
∗F
t is the vector of female wage residuals at male prices of un-
observables.28 In more detail, the ﬁrst term, neglecting the weights, corresponds
basically to the Oaxaca decomposition based on participants.29 The second term
corrects for selection on observables, and the third for selection on unobservables,
which are estimated according to equation (3) using male prices. The residual,
or unexplained part, can then be derived by subtracting the explained part from
the total gap.
We present the results in Tables 3 broken down by work experience as formu-
lated in equation (6). In the table results in panel A are derived from a wage
equation including in addition to year, cohort and work experience ﬁxed eﬀects
27In order to conserve space only the results for the decomposition estimation results are
presented. For more details see Kunze (2002).
28See Juhn et al. (1993). For estimation we split the wage residual distribution into 100
percentiles that allows a very detailed matching.
29This can be seen from substituting ρM = ρF = 1 and ¯uˆ∗Ft =
¯ˆuFt .
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the detailed human capital variables as we have listed them in Table 1, yet exclud-
ing controls for occupational qualification. Results in panel B are based on the
estimates from our most extensive model including approximately 300 dummies
for each occupational qualification.
Table 3 here
The ﬁrst column reports the total observed wage gap. The second column
lists the part that can be explained in absolute terms and as a percentage of
the total wage gap. From panel A, we see that only 9.44 percent of the entry
gap, i.e. zero years of work experience, can be explained by diﬀerences in human
capital characteristics, excluding occupational ﬁxed eﬀects. The contribution of
each component is relatively small and not reported here.30 Moving to panel B
and the estimate of the explained part of the entry wage diﬀerential, we see that
additional 52 percent are explained by the occupational ﬁxed eﬀects. This factor
also remains very important when we estimate the explained part of the gap
correcting for selection on observables (column 3) and selection on unobservables
(column 4). Looking at the evolution of the gap across rows one can see that while
the total gap does not change very much, the explanatory power of the occupation
speciﬁc eﬀects seems to become stronger in relation to the other characteristics.
This result changes only when controlling for selection on unobservables. Then,
the fact that females are relatively better endowed with respect to unobservables
than males means that the explanatory power decreases with the increase in
work experience. In summary, across work experience we ﬁnd that diﬀerences in
occupational qualiﬁcations result in a permanent wage disadvantage for women,
explaining more than 50 percent of the gap at all points in the early career31.
30From Table 1, however, one can see the unweighted diﬀerences in means for the entry wage
spell.
31In addition, we ﬁnd a strong decline across cohorts of the total gap as well as of the
explained fraction of the gap, as shown in the Appendix Table A. This may indicate substantial
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Our estimation results, to some extent, depend on consistent estimation of β
for the male sample wage regression. Consistency is achieved by imposing the
restriction that unobserved individual speciﬁc eﬀects, captured by the error term,
are orthogonal to the explanatory variables in our model. Relaxing this assump-
tion implies that our parameters of interest are estimated with (upward) bias
as well as the explained part of the wage diﬀerential. If the bias is time con-
stant across work experience, however, this caveat does not apply to the change
of the explained part of the gap. In general, one could get around problems
due to unobserved heterogeneity by applying ﬁxed eﬀects estimators. However,
while in ordinary least squares estimates identiﬁcation of the occupation spe-
ciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects comes from cross-sectional variation, in ﬁxed eﬀects estimation
variation across time drives the parameters. As a result, occupational mobility,
which is another potentially endogenous process, further complicates identiﬁca-
tion. Therefore, in this study we ignore somehow these more complicated matters
and maintain rather simple estimators. We argue, however, that although the
quantitative result arguably may be sensitive to the applied estimation technique,
the qualitative results remain unchanged.
6.2 Discussion
Consistent with theory we ﬁnd a large gender gap in employment rates and that
gender diﬀerences in human capital investment are important. Furthermore, con-
sistent with the models by Kuhn (1993) and Barron, et al. (1993) our descriptives
changes that have helped to improve the relative position of young skilled females in the labour
market. Like in other countries, occupational segregation is high and has not changed over
time. On the other hand the 1970s and 1980s have seen structural changes that have increased
the importance of the service sector. In turn eﬀorts have been made to improve the quality
of apprenticeship training schemes. Since males are often trained in the ‘old’ craft sector that
traditionally has high quality training schemes, it is more likely that females proﬁted more
from these improvements. They are more likely to be in training schemes in new service and
telecommunications jobs. See Mu¨nch (1992).
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show an entry wage gap after completion of training and a signiﬁcant gap in work
experience.
Wage diﬀerences in the above models accrue to diﬀerences in ﬁrm speciﬁc
training, and, possibly, diﬀerences in general training. It follows, that the wage
diﬀerential conditional on detailed human capital investment variables is expected
to go to zero. As we have shown this is not supported by our ﬁndings. More than
40 percent of the gap in daily wages, for example 0.4*252=10.08 at entry, are left
unexplained. Taking account of the fact, however, that men may indeed work
longer hours than women, as we have pointed out, and assuming for simplicity
that wages increase linear in hours, a gap of only 3 percent is left unexplained.
In addition, we document the great importance of occupational qualiﬁcation.
This seems in contrast to the theory that stresses the importance of ﬁrm speciﬁc
human capital. Still, it documents the fact that women are selected into low wage
occupations, that may be less productive due to relatively less human capital
investment of a general, occupation speciﬁc, or ﬁrm speciﬁc type. This is in line
with the prediction of gender segregation from the Kuhn model, for example.
Also, similarly to Neal and Johnson (1996) we ﬁnd that pre-market factors,
in distinction to post-market factors, are quite important determinants of wage
diﬀerentials. Neal and Johnson document that the main fraction of the racial
wage gap can be explained by diﬀerences in scores of a test, measuring skills and
ability, administered to teenagers in the U.S. prepared to leave high school. The
authors argue that this pre-market variable is free of discriminatory bias. In our
case, occupational qualiﬁcation, the pre-market factor, is interpreted as a mea-
sure of productivity within occupations and the question is whether it is biased
due to non-random selection into apprenticeship occupations, and discriminatory
forces, in particular. For example, entry barriers that prevent young women from
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choosing freely the occupational training scheme may be such factors. Similarly,
societal rules or images pupils are taught at school and by their parents may
work through the pre-market factor variable. In general, these forces may result
in females from being discouraged from going into high productivity - male - jobs.
Such forces may have strong eﬀects on the choice behaviour of the very young
ones, like in our analysis.
7 Conclusions
We have examined the male-female wage diﬀerential during the early career. For
the analysis we have used German administrative data on young skilled workers
that can be followed over the period 1975 to 1990. The data allow us to compare
a relatively homogeneous group of workers and control for a large number of
detailed human capital characteristics.
Simple descriptive statistics show an entry wage gap of approximately 25 per-
cent that persists throughout the early career. The decomposition of the gap
into the explained part and the residual shows that already at entry a substantial
part of the raw entry wage gap, approximately 50 percent, is due to diﬀerences
in occupational qualiﬁcation, with a further 10 percent due to other diﬀerences
in initial human capital. This result holds under the assumption that choices of
education, i.e. until age 16, and occupational qualiﬁcation or apprenticeship, i.e.
made approximately at age 16, are exogenous.
These results suggest that large permanent wage disadvantages during the
early career are formed by the occupational qualiﬁcation while other detailed
background characteristics and diﬀerences in individual work histories are only
of minor importance. This is consistent with models incorporating ﬁrm speciﬁc
human capital that show that ﬁrms may be less willing to pay for human capital
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investment into women due to women’s higher probability to quit.
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Figure 1: Actual Hours of Work for Full-Time Workers with
11-13 Years of Education, Age 18-30 (Source: Socio Economic
Panel (SOEP) for Germany)
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Figure 2: Employment Rates of Male Skilled Workers, age 18-
30
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Figure 3: Employment Rates of Female Skilled Workers, age
18-30
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Figure 4: Training to Work Transition: Occupational Mobility
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Figure 5: Wages for Full-time Skilled Workers, age 18-30
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Table 1: Sample Means of (Vocationally) Skilled Workers at Entry Wage Spell,
by Gender
female male t-test for
mean (std.) mean ( std.) H0: Equality of means
education
1 if interm. degree .9547 (.2078) .9814 (.1350) -14.37
1 if upper degree .0453 (.2078) .0185 (.1350) 14.37
apprentice. duration 2.18 (.7318) 2.51 (.7418) -40.96
age in ﬁrst job 20.3416 (1.5725) 20.5000 (1.5815) -9.18
occupational qualiﬁcation∗:
Natural products production .0187 .1356 .0280 (.1649) -5.53
Extraction of natural resources .0 (.0) .0090 (.0946) -11.5
Investment goods production .0138 (.1166) .0846 (.2783) -28.88
Consumer goods production .0636 (.2441) .0887 (.2844) -8.58
Construction .0054 (.0739) .1702 (.3758) -52.15
Installment of technical machines .0247 (.1552) .3548 (.4784) -80.20
Services .8542 (.3528) .2105 (.4076) 152.87
Infrastructure services .0193 (.1378) .0539 (.2258) -16.35
skill related variables
job status:
unskilled .0896 (.2856) .1786 (.3831) -23.62
skilled blue collar .1481 (.3552) .6483 (.4775) -106.47
other (foreman) .0004 (.0219) .0009 (.0310) -1.60
skilled white collar .7617 (.4260) .1720 (.3774) 135.31
skill match variables∗∗:
1 if Qual.stayer .7367 (.4404) .6551 (.4753) 16.20
1 if Firm stayer .6368 (.4809) .7015 (.4576) -12.64
1 if Firm+qual.stayer .5301 (.4991) .5295 (.4991) .11
1 if Industry stayer .7950 (.4036) .7983 (.4012) -.7345
# of individuals 14563 19710
Notes: ∗ For calculations, the occupation of qualiﬁcation classiﬁcations of the last spell in
apprenticeships are used. Groups are constructed according to Dietz (1988). ∗∗ Deﬁnition
of skill match variables: Qual. stayer: stayer in occupation of qualiﬁcation (apprenticeship)
measured at 3-digit level. Firm stayer: stayer with training ﬁrm. Firm + qual. stayer: stayer
in occupation of qualiﬁcation and training ﬁrm. Industry stayer: stayer in industry measured
at 2-digit level.
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Table 2: Sample Means for Drop Outs and Continuously Working (Vocationally)
Skilled Females who have reached Two Years of Work Experience
Drop-Outs Continuously Working t-test for
X mean (std.) mean ( std.) H0: Equality of means
age 22.7578 (1.6905) 22.8037 (1.4498) -1.51
time out of work
(until last wage)
.5710 (1.1064) .2300 (.5585) 22.83
1 if non-zero years
of time out
.5613 (.4962) .4429 (.4967) 11.91
education
age at entry into
apprenticeship
16.4714 (1.2086) 16.8310 (1.2547) 14.46
1 if interm. degree .9809 (.1366) .9574 (.2019) 6.30
1 if upper degree .0190 (.1366) .0425 (.2019) -6.30
apprentice. duration 2.077 (.6761) 2.1066 (.7083) -2.07
skill related variables
job status:
unskilled .1376 (.3445) .0992 (.2990) 6.15
skilled blue collar .1543 (.3613) .1130 (.3166) 6.27
other (foreman) .0020 (.0452) .0009 (.0310) 1.52
skilled white collar .7060 (.4556) .7867 (.4096) -9.55
skill match variables∗∗:
1 if Qual.stayer .6067 (.4885) .6355 (.4812) -2.98
1 if Firm stayer .6026 (.4894) .6723 ( .4693) -7.33
1 if Firm+qual.stayer .4202 (.4936) .4706 (.4991) -5.06
1 if Industry stayer .7888 (.4081) .8029 (.3978) -1.75
# of individuals 3415 9300
Notes: Variables are deﬁned as in table 1. Drop-Outs are deﬁned as individuals working,
or with observed wages, in period t − 1 and not working in period t. Continuously working
are individuals with wages observed in period t − 1 and t. Cells show the conditional mean
deﬁned for the drop-outs as: E[Xit | Experiencet = 2, lnwt−1 > 0, lnwt is unobserved], and the
continuously working as E[Xit | Experiencet = 2, lnwt > 0, lnwt−1 > 0].
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Table 3: Decomposition Estimation Results for the Wage Gap among (Vocation-
ally) Skilled Workers, by Years of Work Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work
Expe-
rience
Total wage gap Explained part,
uncorrected for
selection
Explained part,
corrected for se-
lection on ob-
servables
Explained part,
corrected for
selection on
observables and
unobservales
(lnwMpt − lnwFpt) βˆMt (X¯Mpt − X¯Fpt) βˆMt (X¯Mt − ¯ˆXFt )
Panel A: X includes human capital variables, excluding occupation ﬁxed eﬀects
0 .2520 .0238 (9.44 %) .0220 (8.73%) 0.0233 (9.25%)
1 .2485 .0151 (6.07 %) .0132 (5.31%) 0.0222 (8.94%)
2 .2530 .0168 (6.64 % ) .0139 (5.49% ) 0.0212 (8.39%)
3 .2460 .0162 (6.58 %) .0144 (5.85%) 0.0127 (5.18%)
4 .2418 .0158 (6.53 %) .0144 (5.95%) 0.0081 (3.35%)
5 .2464 .0145 (5.88 %) .0137 (5.56%) 0.0052 (2.13%)
6 .2448 .0115 (4.69 % ) .0115 (4.69% ) -0.0081 (-3.33%)
7 .2470 .0126 (5.10 %) .0126 (5.10%) 0.0006 (0.26%)
8 .2287 .0130 (5.68 % ) .0136 (5.94% ) -0.0008 (-0.38%)
Panel B: X includes human capital variables, including occupation ﬁxed eﬀects
0 0.2520 0.1573 (62.41%) 0.1583 (62.80%) 0.1559 (61.89%)
1 0.2485 0.1453 (58.49%) 0.1488 (59.89%) 0.1516 (61.01%)
2 0.2530 0.1445 (57.12%) 0.1471 (58.15%) 0.1471 (58.14%)
3 0.2460 0.1453 (59.07%) 0.1465 (59.56%) 0.1374 (55.89%)
4 0.2418 0.1413 (58.45%) 0.1429 (59.10%) 0.1323 (54.74%)
5 0.2464 0.1412 (57.31%) 0.1438 (58.36%) 0.1262 (51.23%)
6 0.2448 0.1400 (57.20%) 0.1403 (57.31%) 0.1122 (45.86%)
7 0.2470 0.1410 (57.09%) 0.1453 (58.82%) 0.1209 (52.89%)
8 0.2287 0.1379 (60.28%) 0.1392 (60.87%) 0.1148 (50.23%)
Notes: Panel A: The vector XM for males, and XF for females, includes in addition to the
intercept the variables years of work experience speciﬁc eﬀects, cohort speciﬁc eﬀects, cohort
correlated with work experience ﬁxed eﬀects, time ﬁxed eﬀects, age at entry, school degree
(intermediate or upper), apprenticeship duration, a dummy for each job status, and skill match
variables. Panel B: In addition, occupation ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
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Appendix A:
Decomposition Estimation Results for the Wage Gap among
(Vocationally) Skilled Workers, by Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cohort Total wage gap Explained part,
uncorrected for
selection
Explained part,
corrected for se-
lection on ob-
servables
Explained part,
corrected for
selection on
observables and
unobservales
(lnwMpt − lnwFpt) βˆMt (X¯Mpt − X¯Fpt) βˆMt (X¯Mt − ¯ˆXFt )
Panel A: X includes human capital variables, excluding occupation ﬁxed eﬀects
75 .3208 .0798 (24.87%) .0510 ( 15.89 %) 0.1027 ( 32.02 %)
76 .2825 .0438 (15.50%) .0278 ( 9.84 %) 0.0552 ( 19.55 %)
77 .2439 .0283 (11.60% ) .0172 ( 7.05 % ) 0.0164 (6.76 %)
78 .2585 .0218 ( 8.43 %) .0119 ( 4.60 %) 0.0216 (8.38 %)
79 .2474 .0037 ( 1.49 %) -.0031 (-1.25 %) 0.0062 (2.51 %)
80 .2247 -.0036 (-1.60 %) -.0096 (-4.27 %) -0.0154 (-6.87 %)
81 .2206 -.0095 (-4.30% ) -.0122 ( -5.53 % ) -0.0225 (-10.21 %)
82 .2247 -.0117 (-5.20%) -.0134 ( -5.96 %) -0.0127 (-5.67 %)
83 .2078 -.0149 (-7.17 % ) -.0162 (-7.79 % ) -0.0278 (-13.38 %)
84 .1992 -.0151 (-7.58 % ) -.0161 (-8.08 % ) -0.0336 (-16.90 %)
85 .2148 -.0096 (-4.46 % ) -.0105 (-4.88 % ) -0.0282 (-13.16 %)
86 .1974 -.0129 (-6.53 % ) -.0128 (-6.48 % ) -0.0347 (-17.59 %)
87 .1502 .0003 ( 0.19 % ) -.0000 ( 0 % ) -0.1193 (-79.43 %)
Panel B: X includes human capital variables, including occupation ﬁxed eﬀects
75 0.3208 0.2486 (77.47%) 0.2268 (70.68%) 0.2458 (76.63% )
76 0.2825 0.2094 (74.13%) 0.2003 (70.91%) 0.1888 (66.84% )
77 0.2439 0.1672 (68.55%) 0.1634 (66.99%) 0.1478 (60.63% )
78 0.2585 0.1516 (58.63%) 0.1439 (55.66%) 0.1488 (57.59% )
79 0.2474 0.1327 (53.63%) 0.1282 (51.83%) 0.1333 (53.90% )
80 0.2247 0.1178 (52.43%) 0.1135 (50.53%) 0.1096 (48.78% )
81 0.2206 0.1199 (54.36%) 0.1181 (53.52%) 0.1024 (46.45% )
82 0.2247 0.1019 (45.34%) 0.1040 (46.30%) 0.1138 (50.66% )
83 0.2078 0.1114 (53.60%) 0.1110 (53.40%) 0.0941 (45.32% )
84 0.1992 0.1112 (55.82%) 0.1098 (55.11%) 0.0887 (44.56% )
85 0.2148 0.1192 (55.48%) 0.1181 (54.99%) 0.0920 (42.85% )
86 0.1974 0.0956 (48.41%) 0.0963 (48.78%) 0.0858 (43.49% )
87 0.1502 0.0769 (51.20%) 0.0768 (51.13%) -0.0044 (-2.94% )
Notes: See table (3) for further details.
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